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Abstract
We use detailed household-level data from Denmark to ana-
lyze how the introduction of interest-only mortgages affected con-
sumption expenditure and borrowing. Four years after the reform
interest-only mortgages constituted 40 percent of outstanding mort-
gage debt. Using an ex-ante measure of exposure motivated by
financial constraints, we show households who are more likely to use
an IO mortgage, increased consumption substantially following the
reform. The increase in consumption is driven by borrowing at the
time of refinancing and by borrowers with lower pre-reform leverage
ratios. Our results show changes in the mortgage contract can have
large impacts on consumption expenditure.
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1 Introduction
Four years after a 2003 mortgage market reform that introduced interest-
only mortgages in Denmark, these new mortgage products constituted close
to 50 percent of outstanding mortgage debt and aggregate mortgage debt
had increased by 40 percent.1 This increase in debt, which is quantita-
tively similar to the one experienced in the United States over the same
time period, occurred even though the regulatory loan-to-value ratio was
unchanged and sub-prime borrowing was nonexistent and securitization did
not increase. In this article, we ask how the introduction of interest-only
mortgages affected the aggregate economy through its impact on consump-
tion expenditure.
In particular, we analyze the introduction of interest-only mortgages
using detailed household-level data combined with insights from recent
macroeconomic models that incorporate a payment-to-income constraint
for borrowing. In such models, amortization payments directly enter the
borrowing constraint, which allows a reduction in monthly payments either
through lower amortization payments or lower interest rates to directly in-
fluence borrowing capacity (Grodecka, 2019; Kaplan et al., 2017; Green-
wald, 2018). These models stand in contrast to traditional collateral-based
models of credit constraints, where amortization payments do not affect
borrowing directly.
We first provide an intuitive equation for when payment constraints or
leverage constraints are binding. With a loan-to-value constraint and a
payment constraint, borrowing will be determined by the lesser of the two
constraints, which helps us formulate the condition for when payments are
binding: for a sufficiently high house-value-to-income ratio, the payments
on the mortgage constrain borrowing, not the value of the collateral. This
simple equation has an important implication: for a household with low
income but high collateral, the leverage ratio is a poor proxy for credit
constraints. The reason is that even though the leverage ratio is low, any
borrowing against that collateral needs to be funded out of a low income.
1In the US, interest-only mortgages and similar unconventional products accounted
for approximately 50 percent of mortgage origination in 2007, having increased from one
percent in 2000 (Justiniano et al., 2017). See also Barlevy and Fisher (2012) and Dokko
et al. (2019).
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This simple prediction fits the data on borrowing well. House-value-to-
income ratios strongly predict whether households use interest-only mort-
gages: 62 percent of homeowners in the top quartile have an IO mortgage,
compared to 32 percent in the bottom quartile.2 Amromin et al. (2018)
report similar statistics for the US. Consistent with an interaction between
two binding constraints leverage is declining in house-value-to-income ra-
tios, and interest-payments-to-income are increasing.
We proceed to estimate the impact of the introduction of interest-only
mortgages on consumption expenditure of existing homeowners using their
house-value-to-income ratio prior to the reform as a measure of exposure.
Our empirical strategy is essentially based on a comparison between one
group constrained by mortgage payments and one group constrained by
leverage constraints. An extensive analysis of time trends indicates paral-
lel trends in consumption growth prior to the reform across groups with
different levels of exposure, followed by a clear break with increasing con-
sumption growth for groups with high exposure and continued higher con-
sumption levels. We estimate that a one standard-deviation higher house-
value-to-income ratio is associated with a 5 percent increase in consumption
growth. In aggregate, IO mortgages increased consumption by 8.2 percent
between 2003 and 2010, corresponding to 52 percent of the total increase
in consumption expenditure. The effect is driven by young households and
by households with low ex-ante leverage. Higher leverage in 2002 is as-
sociated with a lower response to interest-only mortgages. Although this
finding does not coincide with a relaxation of the binding collateral con-
straint, the result is consistent with the binding PTI constraint limiting
households’ ability to access their collateral. Liquid wealth has little im-
pact on the estimated effect of interest-only mortgages. Moreover, house-
hold consumption expenditure remains high even as the housing-market
cycle turns and house prices decline by about 30 percent. The lack of a
reversal suggests the increase in consumption after interest-only mortgages
were introduced was not driven by housing-wealth effects or labor-market
dynamics.
If interest-only mortgages relax the borrowing constraints, we expect
2This pattern holds after controlling for a wide range of household demographic and
financial characteristics.
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to see higher borrowing at the time of refinancing (what Greenwald, 2018,
calls the “frontloading effect”). We provide evidence for this effect by ex-
ploiting the timing of when the household chooses to refinance to an IO
mortgage (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015; Druedahl and Martinello, 2018). Us-
ing year and household fixed effects to address endogeneity concerns related
to fixed household characteristics and business-cycle effects, we compare
the behavior of households who chose to refinance to an IO mortgage in
different years. The increase in consumption expenditure is almost entirely
driven by higher borrowing at the time of mortgage refinancing: a spike
in consumption expenditure at the time of refinancing is followed by a
reversion toward the previous trend. On average, half of the increase in
mortgage debt at the time of refinancing goes into consumption expendi-
ture. The effect of introducing interest-only mortgages is therefore driven
by a one-time increase in consumption at the time of refinancing, and the
impact of the reform comes from a large share of the population taking out
equity when refinancing to a new mortgage with lower payments.
An analysis of heterogeneous responses suggests older borrowers use
the reduction in mortgage payments to increase consumption afterwards.
The increase in consumption in the year after refinancing is consistent with
consumption-smoothing behavior for older households who wish to live off
their wealth upon retirement. Older households whose retirement income
is lower than their permanent income rationally wish to smooth consump-
tion, which they can do with an IO mortgage (Cocco, 2013, argues similarly
for young households with rising incomes).3 Moreover, the increase in bor-
rowing is lower for households with higher leverage, consistent with our
aggregate-level results.
These findings are similar to the results in the literature that studies
the household response to lower interest payments (Agarwal et al., 2017).4
Bhutta and Keys (2016) find that interest payments have a substantial
impact on household borrowing, with an effect particularly pronounced
3Observing this behaviour requires that a household faces binding credit constraints,
because households who can borrow unrestrictedly could undo any amortization payment
by either refinancing their mortgage and increasing their debt (Hull, 2017), or simply
borrowing more initially and using the additional funds to amortize (Svensson, 2016).
4See also Di Maggio et al. (2017), who find that lower mortgage payments substan-
tially increase consumption and Cloyne et al. (2019), who show that borrowers in the
UK and the US increase their spending in response to lower interest payments.
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among younger borrowers with prime credit scores.
The Danish institutional framework for mortgage financing helps rule
out several other confounding factors. Mortgage debt is more strictly reg-
ulated in Denmark than in the US, with corresponding incentives for both
mortgage banks and households to not unduly speculate on rising house
prices.5 Danish mortgage banks are legally required to evaluate the income
and house value for each borrower to assess whether the borrower can repay
a standard 30-year fixed-rate-mortgage product even in the face of increas-
ing interest rates. This requirement is incentivized through regulation that
mandates that the mortgage banks are liable for any losses incurred on
mortgage bonds by investors, even as those bonds are sold off to investors
(Campbell, 2013). Other criteria for mortgage lending did not change dur-
ing the boom. Mortgage borrowing is limited to 80 percent of the house
value, and borrowers are evaluated on their ability to afford higher interest
payments. Borrowers have a strong incentive to conform to these limits and
not to overextend themselves, because all debt in Denmark is full recourse
(and the laws are enforced). Indeed, Denmark experienced no default crisis,
even as housing markets declined by 30 percent - mortgage arrears peaked
at 0.6 percent of outstanding mortgage debt.
Our paper is related to the studies that examine consumption and bor-
rowing for Danish households in the period around the financial crisis.
Andersen et al. (2016) study how leverage in 2007 affected consumption
growth between 2007 and 2009. They argue the negative relationship be-
tween leverage and consumption is the result of a spending normalization
that occurs because highly levered households borrowed more on the eve
of the crisis to fund consumption. Jensen and Johannesen (2017) find the
supply of credit to banks had a strong negative and persistent effect on the
consumption of their borrowers. Kuchler (2015) finds that in 2012 house-
holds with IO mortgages have lower savings rates and higher loan-to-value
ratios. Finally, two related studies examine how interest-only mortgages
affect consumption among Danish households. Larsen et al. (2018) in-
5Brueckner et al. (2016) argue that because IO mortgages postpone repayments, the
higher risk of negative equity makes this product riskier. In their model, this risk is
mitigated if house-price expectations are high. Our focus on existing homeowners and
the fact that default is a prohibitively expensive option in Denmark limit the concern
that households are using IO mortgages to speculate.
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vestigates the effect of IO mortgages on homeowners in Denmark using a
different data and estimation strategy. In particular, they focus on the use
of funds by comparing the behavior of borrowers with and without interest-
only mortgages. Overall, their study corroborates our results by showing
households with IO mortgages increase their consumption and have higher
mortgage debt. They do not, however, examine the macro-economic im-
pact of the mortgage market reform. De Stefani and Moertel (2019) find
that Danish homeowners with lower levels of liquid assets increased their
consumption more following the introduction of IO mortgages in Denmark,
which led to an increase in employment growth on the municipality level.
Overall, the introduction of IO mortgages led to a large wave of re-
finances, where households who refinanced also extracted equity. This
one-time adjustment in the mortgage market, where a substantial fraction
of mortgage debt is refinanced, can have a large impact on consumption
growth. In general, our study illustrates the importance of payment con-
straints in the mortgage market and provides evidence on how changes in
the mortgage market affect macroeconomic outcomes. These findings are
important not only for characterizing the boom-bust episodes in Denmark,
the US and elsewhere, but also for policies that guard against future crises.
In particular, our results suggest a framework for analyzing the impact
of macroprudential policies on the cross-section of households, and sug-
gest such policies can have a large impact on borrowing and consumption.
Finally, we note that the long-term effects of this reform are yet to be
determined and warrant future research.
2 Background
2.1 The Danish Mortgage Market
The predominant mortgage contract in Denmark has historically been the
30-year fixed-rate mortgage, which made up over 90 percent of outstanding
mortgages in the early 2000s.6 This maturity is the longest and most
6Danish mortgage-credit banks provide mortgage loans to households and sell bonds
to investors using the payments from the mortgage loans. The mortgage system operates
according to a “matched funding” principle, where each mortgage loan is matched by
a mortgage bond sold to investors. A more comprehensive overview can be found in
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popular one. Variable-rate mortgages were introduced in 1997. The interest
rate on mortgages is decided not by the mortgage bank, but by investors
in mortgage bonds.
All borrowers can refinance with no pre-payment penalty, regardless of
their equity position. In other words, no lock-in effect of housing equity
exists. Households can refinance to extract home equity up to the maximum
loan-to-value limit of 80 percent. This requirement is enforced throughout
our sample period for all types of mortgages. The cost for refinancing is
approximately 10,000 DKK (✩1,500) (Andersen et al., 2019). Borrowers are
evaluated on their ability to afford a standard 30-year fixed-rate mortgage
regardless of the mortgage contract they choose, and all mortgage debt
is full recourse. In case of a borrower default, the mortgage bank can
enact a forced sale of the collateralized property. If the proceeds from
the sale are insufficient to cover the outstanding debt, the mortgage bank
can garnish the incomes of the borrower until the debt is repaid. This
mortgage-market design ensures no strategic incentive to default exists in
Denmark, regardless of the equity position.
In addition, mortgage banks are required to assess the credit risk of
the borrower, and have to maintain all credit risk on their balance sheet.
Mortgage-credit banks use the proceeds from their borrowers to issue mort-
gage-backed bonds to investors. Mortgage banks receive fees from borrow-
ers but do not receive interest income and mortgage payments, which in-
stead accrue to the bond investor. To limit moral hazard, mortgage-credit
banks are legally required to retain all credit risk on their balance sheets. If
a borrower defaults, the mortgage bank has to replace the defaulting mort-
gage with a bond with an equivalent interest rate and maturity. Investors
therefore bear all refinancing and interest-rate risks, but face no credit risk.
This system operates without government intervention or direct guarantees.
2.2 Interest-only mortgages in Denmark
Interest-only mortgages were introduced in Denmark in 2003 through a reg-
ulatory reform.7 The regulatory framework specifically details which mort-
Campbell (2013, p. 28) and Kuchler (2015).
7Technically, a bank customer could approximate an interest-only mortgage prior to
the reform by either continuously refinancing (Hull, 2017) or by extracting more equity
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gage products the mortgage banks are allowed to offer their customers. The
purpose of the reform was to increase affordability and flexibility for tem-
porarily credit-constrained households. The expectation was that IO mort-
gages would be a niche product without affecting house prices or consump-
tion.8 The legislation that allowed the mortgage banks to offer interest-only
mortgages, referred to in Denmark as a “deferred amortization” mortgage
(afdragsfrie l˚an), was introduced to the Danish parliament on March 12,
2003, and was voted through parliament on June 4. Mortgage banks could
start selling interest-only mortgages as early as October 2003. The new
product allowed for a 10-year period without amortization payments, after
which the borrower had to repay the outstanding debt over the remaining
life span of the mortgage.
Due to higher principal debt over the first 10 years, total interest-
payments over the life span of the loan are higher for an interest-only
mortgage than for an amortized mortgage. The law proposal specifically
mandates the mortgage banks inform their customers about the higher
cost and higher risk associated with IO mortgages. In 2011, 89 percent
of surveyed IO-loan holders reported being “very well informed” or “well
informed” about the higher cost and higher risk associated with their mort-
gage choice (Association of Danish Mortgage Credit Banks, 2011).
Interest-only mortgages rapidly became a popular product. Figure 1
shows close to a third of outstanding mortgage debt in Denmark was held
in interest-only mortgages three years after the reform. Interest-only mort-
gages are prominently used in areas with high house prices, such as Copen-
hagen or other larger cities, but are also popular in other areas. Examining
Danish municipalities (approximately equivalent to a US county) for 2009,
the right-hand side of Figure 1 shows the lowest penetration is 37 percent
and the highest one is close to 70 percent. This pattern of mortgage use is
somewhat in contrast to evidence from the US, where Amromin et al. (2018)
and Barlevy and Fisher (2012) report that IO mortgages were prominent
and using excess funds to pay the amortization payments. Consequently, the reform can
be seen as allowing for an easier and less expensive way of taking out an interest-only
mortgage product.
8Additional material on the process, the motivation, and the debate surrounding
the introduction of IO loans can be found at https://www.retsinformation.dk/
Forms/R0710.aspx?id=91430 and http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20021/MENU/
00766131.htm.
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Traditional Mortgage Products Interest-Only Mortgages
IO Mortgage Fraction
55.3 - 68.4
52.6 - 55.3
51.7 - 52.6
49.0 - 51.7
46.6 - 49.0
37.0 - 46.6
No data
Figure 1: IO Mortgage Penetration
Notes: The figure on the left plots outstanding mortgage debt in DKK divided into traditional amor-
tizing mortgages and IO mortgages, from Nationalbanken. The grey line plots the fraction of all
outstanding IO mortgages. The figure on the right plots the share of IO mortgages in each municipality
using data from 2009.
Source: Nationalbanken
in areas where house-price growth was high but not elsewhere.
The Danish housing decline and following recession did not reduce the
popularity of these products, in contrast to how the use of similar products
evolved in other countries. Barlevy and Fisher (2012) and Amromin et al.
(2018) find that IO mortgages in the US essentially disappeared after the
housing crash. Cocco (2013) documents that IO mortgages in the UK
became less prominent after a regulatory change in 2000. Even though
Danish house prices declined by a similar magnitude as in the US, these
products remain popular and in use today.
3 Data and Variables
Denmark Statistics provides data on wealth, income, and demographic
characteristics for the entire population of Denmark. The data are col-
lected through third-party reporting and are highly reliable, accurate, and
comprehensive. We collapse the individual-level data to the household level
using a unique family identifier. We then construct a panel of households
taking information on demographics such as age, gender, education, marital
status, the number of children, and municipality of residence; disaggregated
asset and debt information such as stock and bond holdings, cash deposits
in banks, bank debt, and the market value of mortgage debt; labor-market
information such as disposable income, wages, and employment status;
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housing information including ownership status, property value, number of
properties, and housing-market transactions. The oldest (most educated)
member of a household determines the age (education level) of the house-
hold.
An important variable for our analysis is the house-value-to-income ra-
tio. We construct this variable for each household using adjusted tax-
assessed house values divided by disposable income. Administrative data
systematically underestimates actual house value, and we therefore adjust
it using a scaling factor. The scaling factor is a ratio between the actual
sales price and the tax-assessed valuation for all housing transaction in a
given year. We then average the scaling factor for each year-municipality
cell and multiply the tax-assessed house value for each household based on
the municipality of residence.9 Finally, we divide this measure by dispos-
able income to obtain house-value-to-income ratio.
We construct two variables related to credit constraints. First, we mea-
sure liquidity constraints based on the ratio of the sum of stocks, bonds and
cash deposits, and disposable income. Following Browning et al. (2013), we
create a dummy for liquid assets less than 1.5 months of income. Second,
we measure collateral constraints based on the ratio of the value of out-
standing mortgage debt and housing wealth, which we refer to as leverage,
or loan-to-value (LTV). We construct dummies for deciles of leverage, and
a dummy for the LTV ratio above 0.5.
Our key outcome variable is consumption expenditure, and we impute
it using observed information on income and changes in wealth. Consump-
tion spending in a given year is constructed as disposable income minus the
change in net wealth. This procedure has been used in numerous empirical
studies using Danish data (see, e.g., Leth-Petersen, 2010; Browning et al.,
2013; Jensen and Johannesen, 2017). More importantly, imputed consump-
tion expenditure has been validated by comparing it to survey measures,
and has generally performed well on average (Browning and Leth-Petersen,
2003; Kreiner et al., 2015).10 Jensen and Johannesen (2017) compare an
9Denmark Statistics calculates the equivalent scaling factor, but we are unable to use
theirs because of the municipality reform in 2007. For the years when we can compare
our scaling factor to the one provided by Denmark statistics, the two are consistent.
10See also Koijen et al. (2015) for a similar procedure using Swedish data, and Ziliak
(1998), Cooper (2013), and Khorunzhina (2013) for imputed consumption using survey
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aggregated measure of consumption imputed from Danish registry data to
the value of private consumption in the national accounts, and show the
trend in the two measures is very similar from 2003 to 2011. Browning
and Leth-Petersen (2003) find imputed consumption corresponds well to
the self-reported consumption on average, but that outlier values can be
problematic.11 We winsorize consumption expenditure at the 1st and 99th
percentile. Finally, we limit the sample to households who are present
during all relevant years (from 2000 to 2010, a total of 11 periods).
The main concern with imputed consumption is that changes in the
valuation of items on the balance sheet, such as unrealized capital gains
on stock portfolio, will be measured as consumption. Also, an increase in
the interest rate will lead to a decrease in the market value of a fixed-rate
mortgage, increasing net wealth and lowering consumption expenditure.
Unrealized capital gains is not an issue for housing, because we can observe
all property transactions. Focusing on homeowners who do not change their
residence, we remove households who trade housing from the sample and
do not include changes in housing wealth in the imputation.
To address concerns over the stock portfolio (Koijen et al., 2015), we
approximate capital gains on stock portfolios with the market-portfolio re-
turn. Specifically, we multiply the value of stock holdings at the beginning
of the year with the over-the-year growth in the Copenhagen Stock Ex-
change (OMX) C20 index, and calculate active savings as the end-of-year
holdings minus stock holdings at the beginning of the year adjusted for the
capital gains.
We supplement our data with detailed information about mortgage-debt
characteristics. Mortgage data are provided annually by Finance Denmark
starting in 2009, and contain information from the five largest mortgage
banks in Denmark with a total market share of more than 90 percent.12 We
use the origination date to assign the mortgage type for the years before
2009. Specifically, we aggregate loan values and other characteristics based
on the origination year of the mortgage, and then merge these character-
data.
11Koijen et al. (2015) point to a similar issue for consumption imputed from Swedish
administrative data.
12See Andersen et al. (2019) for more information about the registry.
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istics to households prior to 2009.13 For each mortgage, we observe loan
size, bond value, maturity, the origination date of the mortgage, whether
it is an interest-only loan, and whether the mortgage has a fixed interest
rate. We also observe a unique loan number, which can be shared between
several individuals. Because we observe the total loan size and not the
individual’s share of the mortgage, we calculate an equal weight based on
the number of individuals with the same loan number. For example, if a
mortgage loan occurs twice in the data, we assign half the loan value to
each individual. We then aggregate the individual data to the household
level using the family identifiers described above.
Following a related study of Browning et al. (2013), we select house-
holds between ages 22 and 55 who own housing.14 We remove all en-
trepreneurs, because their income and wealth characteristics are less ac-
curately reported, and we remove households who trade their residential
housing during the sample period.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for households for the year 2002,
the year prior to the reform. We report statistics by mortgage type,
which is observed in 2009. We report demographic and financial char-
acteristics for households who refinanced to IO mortgages by 2009 in col-
umn (1), and who had a traditional, amortizing mortgage in 2009 in col-
umn (2). Demographics include age, years of education, family size, and
the employment ratio during the year. Financial characteristics include
house-value-to-income, liquid-assets-to-income, mortgage-to-income, and
interest-payments-to-income. Mortgage rate is the sum of mortgage in-
terest payments divided by the market value of the mortgage. Liquidity
constrained is a dummy for liquid assets less than 1.5 months of income,
and borrowing constrained is a dummy for mortgage value divided by house
value greater than 0.5. House-price growth is defined as the percentage
growth in square-meter prices from 2003 to 2006. Personal-income growth
13With this procedure, we cannot fully classify whether a mortgage is interest-only in
the years prior to the most recent refinancing. The match worsens as we go further back
in time, because households may refinance to take advantage of lower interest rates.
14We have also used a sample of individuals instead of households. The results are
very similar and our conclusions are unchanged.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Households in 2002 prior to the Reform
by ex-post Mortgage Choice
Difference
IO Mortgage Traditional Mortgage Highest-Lowest
(1) (2) (3)
Household Demographic Characteristics
Age 45.49 45.05 -0.43
(6.60) (6.31) [-11.05]
Education Length 14.47 14.42 -0.06
(2.09) (2.10) [-4.34]
Family Size 3.29 3.24 -0.05
(1.21) (1.20) [-7.46]
Employment Ratio during the Year 0.97 0.97 0.00*
(0.08) (0.08) [2.36]
Financial Characteristics
Housing Wealth to Income 3.92 3.45 -0.48
(1.60) (1.36) [-53.73]
Liquid Assets to Income 0.23 0.28 0.05
(0.42) (0.43) [17.89]
Mortgage to Income 2.36 1.86 -0.51
(1.03) (0.89) [-87.62]
Mortgage Rate 0.06 0.07 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) [37.03]
Interest Payments to Income 0.13 0.11 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) [-75.28]
Liquidity Constrained 0.55 0.45 -0.10
(0.50) (0.50) [-33.10]
Borrowing Constrained 0.79 0.68 -0.11
(0.41) (0.47) [-41.63]
Consumption growth 2002-2006 0.14 0.09 -0.05
(0.51) (0.46) [-17.55]
Income growth 2002-2006 0.03 0.05 0.02
(0.19) (0.16) [22.74]
House Price Growth 2003-2006 39.42 35.19 -4.23
(15.04) (14.98) [-46.36]
Households 44,633 68,643 113,276
Notes: We report descriptive statistics for households’ demographic and financial characteristics
by mortgage choice for 2002 for households who refinanced to IO mortgage by 2009 (column (1)),
and who had a traditional, amortizing mortgage in 2009 (column (2)). Column 3 reports the
differences between columns 1 and 2, including the results from a t-test for differences. Liquidity
constrained is a dummy for liquid assets less than 1.5 months of income, and borrowing constrained
is a dummy for mortgage value divided by house value greater than 0.5. Standard deviations are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for the t-test.
is the percentage growth in income from all sources.
We find higher mortgage-to-income and interest-payments-to-income,
and a larger share of households facing liquidity and borrowing constraints
prior to refinancing among those with an IO mortgage. Also, IO mortgage
holders experienced lower income growth, faster consumption growth, and
higher house-price growth over the housing-market boom period.
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4 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we consider how household consumption may respond to
a relaxation of borrowing constraints induced by an IO mortgage. We fo-
cus on households-homeowners, who possibly have a mortgage debt and
may choose refinancing to an IO mortgage once it becomes available. A
useful starting point is to consider a household that can borrow freely and
consumes without restrictions. An unconstrained household can set a de-
sired consumption path, borrow when current resources are low relative
to lifetime resources, and pay down debt when current resources are high
relative to permanent resources.15 Absent any shocks, a relaxation of bor-
rowing constraints through an IO mortgage should not affect consumption,
becuase the household already could borrow and consume as much as de-
sired.16
For borrowing-constrained households who consume below the desired
level, a relaxation of a constraint can induce higher consumption through
higher borrowing, which typically modeled by relaxing loan-to-value con-
straint in the literature with the borrowing constrained by collateral value
(see Guerrieri and Uhlig, 2016, for a comprehensive overview). A loan-
to-value constraint allows the household to borrow an amount M up to a
fraction θH of house value H:
M ≤ θHH.
Relaxing the above constraint involves either a higher collateral value H
or a higher LTV limit θH . If the household faces only this constraint an
interest-only mortgage will not affect borrowing, because amortization pay-
ments are not a part of the constraint.
Recent models have instead turned towards payment-to-income con-
straints, where borrowing is limited by mortgage payments (Greenwald,
15In a model of consumption with an amortization requirement, Svensson (2016) shows
that although consumption remains constant with higher amortization payments, as long
as the interest rate for the borrowing rate is equal to the interest rate on savings, bor-
rowing may actually increase for unconstrained households, because households borrow
more to compensate for the higher amortization payments.
16Here, we are abstracting from precautionary savings, which the household may
reduce if credit is easier to access.
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2018; Kaplan et al., 2017). A PTI constraint limits borrowing by restrict-
ing interest payment rm and amortization payments γ to a fraction θY of
income Y :
M(γ + rm) ≤ θY Y. (1)
Relaxing this constraint involves either a higher PTI limit θY , higher in-
come, or a lower mortgage payment. Although the focus has mainly been
on lower interest payments (and a higher PTI limit; see, e.g., Greenwald,
2018), the amortization payments have an equivalent effect. For instance, a
household with a mortgage interest rate of 5 percent and a 3 percent amor-
tization rate that wishes to keep mortgage payments below 20 percent of
income is limited to borrowing at most 2.5 times her current income. If
amortization payments were removed, borrowing can increase to four times
income.17 A similar increase in maximum borrowing would occur if the
mortgage rate were reduced to 2 percent.
For a constrained household, an interest-only mortgage increases bor-
rowing if the PTI constraint is binding. Conversely, an interest-only mort-
gage does not affect borrowing if the LTV constraint is binding. The key
question to understanding how IO mortgages affect borrowing and con-
sumption is which constraint is active. We can rewrite the above constraints
as:
M¯ ltv = θHH and M¯
pti =
θY Y
(γ + rm)
,
where M¯ ltv and M¯pti denote the maximum borrowing given the LTV and
PTI constraint, respectively. For a borrower who has to fulfill both con-
straints simultaneously, the minimum of these two terms will determine
borrowing. We can write the overall debt limit as M¯ = min(M¯ ltv, M¯pti).
Because household borrowing capacity is subject to both constraints simul-
taneously, borrowing capacity is determined by the lower of the constraints.
In other words, the PTI constraint will be binding if M¯pti < M¯ ltv, or:
θY Y
(γ + rm)
< θHH.
17Borrowing to income in the initial example is equal to 0.20/(0.05 + 0.03) = 2.5.
With lower amortization payments, the borrowing capacity is equal to 0.20/0.05 = 4
times income.
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Figure 2: Borrowing under Two Constraints
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(a) Borrowing with a PTI and LTV Constraint
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(b) Maximum Borrowing and Leverage
Notes: We set the interest rate to 7 percent and amortization payments to 3 percent,. We set the LTV
constraint θH equal to 0.8 and the PTI constraint θY equal to 0.2. Both house values and borrowing
are divided by income.
Rearranging, we get an expression for when the PTI constraint is binding:
H
Y
>
θY
γ + rm
1
θH
. (2)
From above, if a household is facing borrowing constraints, the PTI con-
straint is binding for sufficiently high values of H/Y . Intuitively, for suffi-
ciently high H/Y , the payment for borrowing is binding and not the value
of the collateral. Even if collateral value is high enough that the LTV con-
straint is not binding, the household is unable to take advantage of higher
collateral and cannot borrow more.
We illustrate this result in Figure 2, where we plot borrowing according
to each constraint in panel (a) and the maximum borrowing in panel (b).
House value and borrowing are both scaled by income. Following the in-
stitutional framework in Denmark, we set θH to 80 percent of house value,
and θY to 20 percent of income.
18 The LTV constraint implies maximum
borrowing is linear in collateral values – as the house-value-to-income ra-
tio increases, so does maximum borrowing. The LTV constraint in action
is shown by the blue line, where the slope is equal to θH . The PTI con-
straint is represented by the red dashed line. This constraint is not affected
18Formally, the Danish institutional framework does not require enforcing PTI con-
straint, although the data show mortgage banks enforce this constraint. The LTV
constraint is set by law.
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Figure 3: Borrowing under Two Constraints
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(b) Maximum Borrowing and Leverage
Notes: The interest rate is 7 percent and amortization payments are 3 percent of mortgage debt. The
collateral constraint, θH , is equal to 0.8 and the PTI constraint, θY , is equal to 0.2. Both house values
and borrowing are divided by income.
by the value of the collateral – the PTI constraint is constant over H/Y .
With an interest rate of 7 percent and amortization payments of 3 percent,
maximum borrowing is equal to 2 times the income.
In part (b) of Figure 2, we plot maximum borrowing according to each
constraint, where the overall borrowing constraint switches from the LTV
constraint to the PTI constraint at the threshold in equation (2). For all
values of H/Y above 2.5, the PTI constraint is binding, which is indicated
by the dashed vertical line in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).19 Whereas the col-
lateral values are sufficient to meet the LTV constraint, the payment on
any borrowing above the level of 2.5 will not satisfy the PTI constraint.
Conversely, for H/Y below 2.5, the collateral constraint is binding and the
household can only borrow 80 percent of the collateral value, even though
the PTI constraint is slack. The household is not fully using her collateral
above the H/Y value of 2.5. In addition, the leverage (borrowing divided
by house value) is declining in H/Y . As the PTI constraint becomes bind-
ing, the household is unable to borrow against collateral and the leverage
falls.
Now consider what happens with borrowing under the two constraints
when interest-only mortgage becomes available. In Figure 3, we plot the
change in borrowing as the amortization payment is set to zero, and the
maximum borrowing capacity of a household constrained by the PTI con-
19The PTI constraint is binding if H/Y is greater than 0.2/(0.07+0.03)×1/0.8 = 2.5.
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straint increases. This is illustrated by a shift of the red dashed line. For
values of H/Y below 2.5 times income, borrowing does not change. For
these households, removing amortization payments has no impact on bor-
rowing. For values above 2.5, however, borrowing increases. For some
house-value-to-income the binding constraints switch from PTI to LTV,
creating an angled upward slope of the red dashed line. Borrowing is there-
fore increasing in H/Y , although the effect is non-linear in three sections
of the H/Y values: (1) zero when the LTV constraint is binding; (2) equal
to the borrowing constraint on the LTV ratio between the new and old
threshold values due to a constraint switching effect; and (3) equal to the
increase in the PTI limit if the LTV constraint does not start to bind. The
switch from the PTI constraint to the LTV constraint in the second part of
the H/Y distribution is emphasized in Greenwald (2018), and implies cer-
tain households are not able to take full advantage of the potential increase
in borrowing. Moreover, the full advantage from the potential increase in
borrowing can only be available to households with values above the new
threshold.
Figure 9 in the appendix shows how borrowing changes when the LTV
ratio is changed. Borrowing increases if the LTV constraint is binding,
but the higher maximum LTV ratio also makes the PTI constraint tighter.
Effectively, this result arises because the borrower is able to borrow more
against the collateral, which means the PTI constraint becomes binding
faster.
Empirical support for two borrowing constraints
Our conceptual framework has some predictions that are validated in the
data. First, if IO mortgages can relax the binding PTI constraint and
this effect can be predicted by H/Y , then IO mortgages would be increas-
ing in H/Y . Panel (a) in Figure 4 shows this prediction is born out in
the data: the house-value-to-income ratio in 2002 strongly predicts subse-
quent IO mortgage use. The figure plots the loan share against the house-
value-to-income ratio measured in 2002, showing a strong positive corre-
lation between the IO mortgage share and house-value-to-income ratio for
17
Figure 4: IO loan share, consumption to income, leverage, and interest
payments to income against the house-value-to-income ratio
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Notes: All bins control for year of origination and municipality fixed effects.
binned bivariate averages, or “binscatters.”20 Second, the figure shows the
consumption-to-disposable-income ratio is increasing in the house-value-to-
income ratio, which suggests the consumption rate is higher for households
with a high house-value-to-income ratio. The higher spread around the
line in panel (b) indicates more variation exists within each bin, showing
the presence of heterogeneity in consumption-to-disposable-income across
house-value-to-income ratios. Third, we plot leverage over H/Y in panel
(c). This pattern is consistent with binding payment-to-income constraints
interacting with collateral constraints as in Figure 2(b). Borrowers with
high house-value-to-income ratios who face two constraints are unable to
borrow against their home equity, and thus leverage is lower.
20The results are robust to excluding any controls and to focusing on mortgages origi-
nated between 2004 and 2006, if we use loan size at origination or loan-to-income values,
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The conceptual framework also predicts that interest payments are in-
creasing in H/Y (see Figure 10 in the appendix), but that the curve be-
comes flat as the borrower hits the PTI constraint. Figure 4(d) does not
fully support this prediction, instead showing that interest-payments-to-
income continue to increase with house-value-to-income ratio. However,
according to panel (a), the IO mortgage share is also increasing in H/Y .
If borrowers can substitute amortization payments for interest-payments,
interest-payments-to-income continue to increase inH/Y , albeit at a slower
pace. Figure 4 supports this line of reasoning. A regression analysis (not
reported) confirms the coefficient on H/Y on interest payments is smaller
for values of H/Y higher than 4. The difference in the coefficients is sta-
tistically significant.
Overall, a framework with both PTI and LTV constraints generates
clear predictions for borrowing that correspond well to the data.
5 The Impact of IOMortgages on Consump-
tion Expenditure
We use two different methodologies to estimate the impact of IO mortgages
on consumption and borrowing. Because we cannot perfectly observe who
holds an IO mortgage before 2009, and because the decision to refinance to
IO mortgage may be correlated with other variables that drive consumption
growth, we begin with a strategy that leverages an ex-ante measure of
exposure to IO mortgages in an intent-to-treat analysis.
5.1 Empirical Strategy
Using the measure of exposure to IO mortgages, we follow the conceptual
framework in section 4 in estimating the effect of relaxed borrowing con-
straints on consumption expenditure. Specifically, we use the pre-reform
house-value-to-income ratio to identify households who are more likely to
face binding PTI constraints, and who are therefore more likely to bene-
if we focus only on mortgages originated in the housing boom, if we use municipality-
level data, if we split the sample into households up to 40 or above, and if we focus on
the sample that we use in the estimation.
19
fit from IO mortgages. Our empirical strategy exploits the cross-sectional
variation in the ex-ante house-value-to-income ratios (“Exposure”) to iso-
late the effect of the new mortgage product on household consumption
expenditure. By ranking households prior to the reform, we also avoid
households selecting into high house-value-to-income ratios in anticipation
of the reform. Berger et al. (2016) and Mian and Sufi (2012) use a similar
strategy to estimate the causal effect of a national policy on groups with
various treatment intensity.
We estimate the following regressions:
Consumptioni,τ→T
Consumptioni,2000
= α + βExposurei × τ + γXi + δτ + ǫi,τ , (3)
where Consumptioni,τ is consumption expenditure for household i in time
periods τ and Exposurei is the house-value-to-income ratio in 2002zero
mean and unit variance. We scale consumption by its value in 2000 to
estimate growth rates, similar to Berger et al. (2016). By scaling the con-
sumption expenditure by its 2000 value instead of using year-over-year
changes, we reduce the noise and additionally avoid equity extraction in
one year from unduly affecting consumption growth.21 All control variables
are measured in 2002, and we cluster standard errors at the municipality
level.
Although the IO mortgage share is strongly correlated with the exposure
variable, a valid concern is that characteristics unrelated to IO mortgages
are driving differences in consumption growth for low- versus high-exposure
households. For example, areas with higher IO-loan penetration may expe-
rience higher income growth over the business cycle, leading to differential
trends in income growth and thereby consumption. Further, the introduc-
tion of IO mortgages may lead to changes in homeownership over the cycle,
as households adapt their housing choice to the newly available mortgage
choice. To address the last issue, we measure house-value-to-income prior
21Andersen et al. (2016) show households with high values of consumption in 2007
experienced large declines in the next-year consumption because of mean-reversion fol-
lowing equity withdrawal. If a household borrows (extracts equity), consumption ex-
penditure in that year will be high due to the imputation procedure. The next year,
however, consumption will be low, because the household is not likely to extract equity
again. Year-over-year growth rates in consumption expenditure will therefore first be
high and then negative.
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to the mortgage reform to ensure our measure is not conflated with home-
ownership decisions later in the business cycle. Table 4 in the Appendix
reports summary statistics for households in different groups of exposure,
showing significant differences between households depending on exposure.
Importantly, the house-price growth is different for groups with high and
low exposure, income growth does not differ much, and the mortgage rates
are statistically but not economically different.
We further employ multiple additional strategies to address these con-
cerns. First, we use growth rates in consumption instead of levels, thereby
removing differences caused by different income or consumption levels. Sec-
ond, we provide extensive tests for parallel trends in the pre-treatment pe-
riod. Third, we explicitly control and test for the housing-wealth effect,
because house-price growth is higher for household with higher. Fourth,
our results are robust to including controls for income growth, changes in
mortgage rates and municipality fixed effects to control for income shocks
at the local level. All these results increase our confidence that we are
identifying the causal effect of IO mortgages on consumption.
5.2 Main Results
First, we show our main result graphically. Figure 5(a) plots the coeffi-
cients on Exposure interacted with the year dummies in a regression (3).
The coefficient on exposure is estimated close to zero and not statistically
significant for 2001 - 2003, but is positive and statistically significant af-
ter the introduction of IO mortgages. Consumption expenditure increases
more for households with higher ex-ante exposure to IO mortgages, a result
that does not reverse over time, even after house prices start decreasing in
2008 and 2009. This pattern is not consistent with short-term shocks af-
fecting consumption, such as business-cycle effects, income expectations, or
housing-wealth effects, because those would revert back once the economy
and housing market start declining in 2007.
Next, we present evidence on the effect of higher exposure on con-
sumption growth in Figure 5(b), following Berger et al. (2016). The figure
plots scaled consumption for 100 bins based on pre-reform house-value-to-
income. The vertical axis shows households sorted by their 2002 house-
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Figure 5: Consumption Expenditure by Exposure
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Notes: Figure (a) plots the coefficients on Exposure from regression (3), and the 95 percent confi-
dence intervals, marked with dashed lines. Control variables include dummies for age, family size, and
education level. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level. Figure (b) plots a difference-
in-differences, year-by-year heatmap of consumption expenditure. The vertical axis sorts households
into 100 bins based on Exposurei, and the horizontal axis shows years. Each cell color corresponds to
the level of the outcome variable (consumption scaled by the value of consumption in 2000) after we
partial out control variables.
value-to-income ratios, and the horizontal axis indicates year. A higher
value on the vertical axis corresponds to a higher house-value-to-income
ratio in 2002 (a higher exposure). Each cell shading shows the value of
consumption scaled by its year 2000 value. This approach allows for per-
forming the traditional graphical pre-trend comparisons between different
groups for the population distribution. Each cell corresponds to the trend
in consumption growth for a specific group, where we can use the rela-
tive shading prior to the introduction of IO mortgages in 2003 to examine
different pre-trends in consumption growth.
Prior to the introduction of IO mortgages in late 2003, consumption
growth is similar across groups, indicating parallel trends in consumption
growth, and suggesting the assumption behind the empirical strategy is
valid. After 2004, consumption increases for the households who benefit
the most from the reform. Consumption growth in 2005 appears to be
monotonically increasing in the ex-ante benefit of choosing an IO mortgage,
showing the results are not driven by outliers. Moreover, the impact of IO
mortgages is seemingly not short-lived. This observation is consistent with
a higher consumption level or conversely a lower savings rate. It is also
consistent with higher exposure leading to a higher likelihood of refinancing
to extract equity in each year. If individuals with higher exposure are more
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Table 2: Consumption by Exposure for Different Time Periods
No Controls Dem.Controls Inc & Mortgage Rate Low HP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Reform×Exposure -0.001 0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Early Post-Reform×Exposure 0.041 0.049 0.019 0.016
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Late Post-Reform×Exposure 0.064 0.072 0.033 0.031
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1,517,471 1,514,460 1,489,933 1,317,044
Notes: The table presents estimates of the per-period effect of exposure on consumption growth from
cross-section regression (3), where Exposure is normalized to zero mean and unit variance. All regres-
sions include municipality dummies. Column (2) includes age, family sizes, and education as control
variables. In column (3), we control for a household-specific mortgage rate for the period and disposable-
income growth. Column (4) removes households in the top quartile of house-price growth, calculated
as the increase in square-meter prices from 2002 to 2006. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses.
likely to refinance compared to individuals with low exposure this would
lead to higher consumption growth for for groups with higher exposure once
we aggregate individuals into groups. Additionally, this observation is not
consistent with cyclical factors such as house-price growth or temporary
income shocks that reverse once house prices decline starting in 2007 and
the labor market turns.
Table 2 provides the estimates of a regression of exposure on consump-
tion scaled by its 2000 value over different time periods, formulated in
equation (3). We estimate equation (3) over three time periods: a pre-
reform period from 2000 to 2002, an early post-reform period from 2003 to
2006, and a late post-reform period from 2007 to 2010. We divide the post-
reform period into an early and late periods to examine whether different
house-price regimes affect the results. The results in this table confirm the
results in the previous figures for a variety of specifications. In the pre-
reform period, we find no significant coefficient on exposure. Even after
we include various controls, the coefficient on exposure for the pre-reform
period is either very small or not statistically significant. Consistent with
the results in the above figures, Exposure predicts higher consumption for
the post-reform period. The results in column (1) and (2) with or without
demographic controls indicate a 4.1 - 4.9 percent increase in consumption
relative to its 2000 value for a one-standard-deviation increase in exposure
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in the years immediately after the reform, and a 6.4 - 7.2 percent increase
for the period of 2007 - 2010. Therefore, consumption expenditure is con-
sistently higher for households with higher values of exposure, and shows
no sign of reversing when house-price growth turns negative in 2008 - 2009.
However, other factors correlated with exposure could drive consump-
tion growth. In particular, lower interest rates and higher income growth
can potentially cause higher consumption. Lower interest rates would also
affect the PTI constraint in a similar manner to an IO mortgage. If the
PTI constraint is binding, a variable-rate mortgage with a lower interest
rate would also allow for higher borrowing. Similarly, higher income growth
relaxes the PTI constraint and allows for higher consumption. To address
these concerns, we control for the per-period interest rate and disposable-
income growth in column (3) of Table 2. The effect is reduced in magnitude
but qualitatively not changed. In column (4), we exclude households liv-
ing in municipalities in the top quartile of high house-price growth during
housing boom (2004-2007). The coefficients are reduced in magnitude but
remain significant.
We also test whether groups that are more likely to be financially
constrained reacted differently to the introduction of interest-only mort-
gages. The results are available in Table 3 for the pooled-sample period
(2004-2010). In all regressions, we control for the variable of interest and
interpret the results of the interaction as an additional effect of higher
exposure for a particular group. We examine two proxies for financial
constraints: liquid-assets-to-income (Liquidity) to proxy for liquidity con-
straints and mortgage-to-housing-value (Leverage) to proxy for LTV con-
straints. Low liquid assets imply the household is hardly saving except
through mortgage payments, which makes this household more likely to
be financially constrained (Gross and Souleles, 2002). The coefficient on
Exposure×Liquidity in column (2) of Table 3 is not statistically different
from zero. In column (3), we find a higher leverage predicts a lower re-
sponse. Figure 6(a) shows this relationship follows an inverse U-shape. We
divide the sample into 10 groups based on 2002 leverage, and plot the coef-
ficient on the interaction between leverage and exposure. The coefficient on
exposure for the groups with the lowest and highest leverage is small. For
households in the middle, the coefficient on leverage is noticeably larger.
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Table 3: Post-Reform Heterogeneity Depending on Credit Constraints
Benchmark Liquidity Leverage Young HP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposure 0.055 0.057 0.060 0.049 0.050
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Exposure×Zi -0.005 -0.012 0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Exposure×HP Growth quartile 2 -0.003
(0.007)
Exposure×HP Growth quartile 3 0.006
(0.007)
Exposure×HP Growth quartile 4 0.020
(0.007)
Observations 1,514,460 1,514,460 1,514,460 1,514,460 1,514,460
Notes: The table presents estimates of the post-reform (2004-2010) period effect of exposure on con-
sumption growth, where exposure is normalized to zero mean and unit variance. The results are from
the following regression:
Consumptioni,τ→T
Consumptioni,2000
= α+ β1Exposurei × τ + β2Exposurei × Zi × τ + γXi + δτ + ǫi,τ ,
where the dependent variable is consumption expenditure normalized by its 2000 value. We include
age dummies, family size dummies, education level, and municipality dummies, a dummy for liquidity
constrained in 2002, leverage dummy in 2002, and house-price growth quartile dummies. House-price
growth is calculated as the increase in square-meter prices from 2002 to 2006. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on municipality in
parentheses.
This pattern is consistent with tighter borrowing constraints for highly lev-
ered households, who are not able to take advantage of the reduction in
payments. The conceptual framework predicts the borrower is unable to
increase consumption from the lower payment on the IO loan if the LTV
constraint is binding (consumption could increase because of a lower amor-
tization payment, however). Consistent with a binding LTV constraint to
limit the response to lower amortization payments (see Bhutta and Keys,
2016), the increase in consumption is smaller for households with higher
leverage.
In column (4) of Table 3, we show the impact of exposure on consump-
tion is larger for households younger than 45 in 2002. Figure 6(b) shows
this relationship is approximately linear. Larsen et al. (2018) similarly show
that young households use IO mortgages to increase consumption, whereas
households above 45 use them to increase pension savings and investments.
In column (5) of Table 3, we provide results depending on house-price
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity in Results by Age and Leverage
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Notes: The figures presents estimates of the post reform (2004-2010) period effect of exposure on
consumption growth for (a) the leverage deciles, and (b) householder age, where exposure is normalized
to zero mean and unit variance. The dependent variable is consumption expenditure normalized by
its 2000 value. In all specifications we include age dummies, family size dummies, education level, and
municipality dummies. Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. 95 percent confidence
intervals.
growth during the boom. We divide municipalities into four groups accord-
ing to the house-price growth, and estimate the results for exposure for each
house-price growth quartile. The impact of exposure is larger in areas with
the highest house-price growth, but is still positive and significant even in
areas with low house price growth.
5.3 Aggregate Estimates
Following Berger et al. (2016) and Mian and Sufi (2012), we compute the
aggregate impact of interest-only mortgages on consumption by exploiting
cross-sectional differences in exposure. We choose the bottom 1 percent
of exposure as the control group, and compute the impact of the reform
relative to this group. Standardized exposure is -1.64 for the bottom group,
increasing to 6.9 for the top group. For each group g, the aggregate increase
in consumption due to IO mortgages is equal to:
∆Consumptiong = β × (eg − (−0.65))× Consumptiong,2002, (4)
where β is the coefficient on post-reform in column (1) of Table 3 for the
full post-reform period, eg is the standardized exposure of group g, and
Consumptiong,2002 is the consumption expenditure for group g in 2002.
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We calculate the aggregate impact of IO mortgages on consumption expen-
diture by summing across all groups. The total increase in consumption
expenditure for our sample over the post-reform period is 14.7 percent.
Provided that the bottom group is a legitimate control group, we estimate
the introduction of interest-only mortgages increased consumption expen-
diture by 8.2 percent between 2003 and 2010, corresponding to 52 percent
of the total increase in consumption.
5.4 Discussion of Aggregate Level Results
Our results show households who are more likely to take out an interest-
only have a higher consumption growth than households who are less likely
to do so. In essence, our empirical strategy uses the group with the lowest
exposure as the counterfactual, meaning we assume this group does not
benefit from the reform. From our conceptual framework, households with
low exposure are likely constrained by the LTV constraint and thus do
not benefit from lower mortgage payments. Although Figure 6(a) shows
households with high leverage do not respond strongly to the reform, valid
reasons exist for discussing the assumption. Indeed, households with low
exposure also use IO mortgages and their consumption may well increase
due to lower savings.
In particular, an important consideration is the general equilibrium
effect of the reform, particularly with regards to the dramatic increase
in house prices that followed the introduction of interest-only mortgages
(Ba¨ckman and Lutz, 2018). IO mortgages can be valuable for payment-
constrained borrowers, and these borrowers could use the increase in bor-
rowing to bid up prices, which would lead to higher collateral values and
affect the borrowing of households facing leverage constraints. When col-
lateral values are high, households with low exposure could increase their
consumption. Then our low exposure control group is also positively af-
fected by the reform, which affects our results to the extent that the control
group benefits from higher collateral values. Importantly, this implies we
underestimate the effects of the reform, because the control group is also
positively affected. At least a share of initially PTI-constrained households
benefit from an increase in collateral values. When the PTI constraint be-
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comes looser, some households switch from being constrained by payments
to being constrained by collateral.
If house prices increase for a different reason, perhaps due to house-
price expectations, the housing-wealth effects represents another threat to
our empirical design. However, previous studies using Danish data do not
find large housing-wealth effects (Browning et al., 2013), or find wealth ef-
fects are driven by the incentive to refinance (Andersen and Leth-Petersen,
2019). Moreover, given the municipality fixed effects in our empirical de-
sign, households with higher exposure within a municipality would have to
benefit more from higher house prices. The previous results instead suggest
households with high exposure should have a lower marginal propensity to
consume out of housing wealth compared to households with low exposure:
arguably, households with lower leverage are driving the results, which con-
trasts the empirical evidence that more levered households have a higher
MPC out of housing wealth (see, e.g., Mian et al., 2013).
Finally, if house-price shocks are driving the results, we would expect
a decline in consumption in the late post-reform period (2007-2010), be-
cause house prices decreased dramatically during this period (see, e.g.,
Mian et al., 2013). The year-by-year results in Figure 5 do not support
this hypothesis.
6 Borrowing Level and Savings Rate after
Refinancing to an Interest-Only Mortgage
The previous results show consumption increased more for households ex-
posed to interest-only mortgages. In this section, we employ a different
identification strategy that exploits the timing of mortgage refinancing to-
gether with the household fixed effects to estimate how consumption is
affected by refinancing. This exercise allows for disentangling the growth
in consumption expenditure into two parts. First, a spike in consumption-
to-income at the time of refinancing indicates an increase in borrowing
for consumption purposes at the time a household chooses an interest-
only mortgage. Second, a lower savings rate will be reflected in a higher
consumption-to-income ratio after the initial borrowing period.
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Figure 7: Example of Identification Strategy
Note: The figure shows the estimated effects and 95 percent confidence intervals of refinancing to an
IO mortgage on consumption to disposable income in 2005 and 2006. The plotted coefficients are year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered on the individual borrower level.
Estimating dynamic effects can be challenging for several reasons. House-
holds who choose an interest-only mortgage may differ from the rest of the
population in ways that affect their consumption expenditure. For instance,
Andersen et al. (2019) show Danish households differ in their propensity
to refinance. Although we control for fixed characteristics, time-varying
characteristics correlated with choosing an interest-only mortgage provide
a challenge, because households may respond differently to time-varying
incentives to refinance. To address this concern, we select a sample of
households who refinance to an interest-only mortgage, and exploit the dif-
ference in timing across refinancing events. A similar strategy is employed
by Druedahl and Martinello (2018) to study the effect of inheritances on
long-run wealth accumulation and by Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) to study
the effect of health shocks on household labor supply.
The difference-in-differences approach is illustrated in Figure 7. Con-
sumption-to-income ratios are similar up to 2004, start to differ in the
year prior to refinancing, spike in the year of refinancing, and converge to
a similar level after refinancing. We can eliminate year and group fixed
effects by using the variation in the figure, but doing so limits us to the
information available for those two years. To implement the same strategy
for all years, we follow Druedahl and Martinello (2018) and describe the
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Figure 8: Dynamics of Consumption and Mortgage Debt
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Notes: The figures shows the estimated effects and 95 percent confidence intervals of refinancing to an
IO mortgage on (a) mortgage to disposable income and (b) consumption to disposable income. The
effects are estimated before and after refinancing to an IO mortgage according to equation 5. Standard
errors are clustered on the individual borrower level.
consumption-to-disposable-income ratio C/Y at year t of a household i
refinancing at time τi as
Ci,t
Yi,t
= γ<−31[t− τi < −3] +
−2∑
n=−5
γpren 1[t− τi = n]
+
6∑
n=0
γpostn 1[t− τi = n] + αt + ψi + ǫi,t,(5)
where αt and ψi are year and household fixed effects, respectively. We re-
peat the procedure for mortgage-debt-to-income and total-assets-to-income.
For any observation prior to three years before refinancing, γ<−3 is a nor-
malization. The reference category for γpre and γpost is two years before
refinancing. All regression estimations are clustered at the household level.
Druedahl and Martinello (2018) show this approach can be viewed as an
event study with separately identifiable year and year-by-cohort fixed ef-
fects. The approach maintains the identification assumption of a common
difference-in-differences, but allows us to use all available information in the
same estimation to identify the effect of choosing an IO mortgage beyond
the point where the second group chooses an IO mortgage.
We present results in Figure 8 and Table 5. Figure 8(a) shows the
mortgage-debt-to-income ratio spikes in the year of refinancing. Relative
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to the average, the ratio increases by 19 percent at the time of refinancing
and remains elevated in the years after refinancing. The increase in mort-
gage debt in the same period translates into a large impact on consumption
expenditure – the consumption-to-disposable-income ratio increases by 15
percent at the time of refinancing. Together, these quantities imply that
about three quarters of the mortgage debt goes into consumption expendi-
ture.
Notably, we do not find that consumption expenditure is higher after
refinancing to an IO mortgage. Together with the result that consump-
tion spikes in the year of refinancing, the impact on consumption from
IO mortgages is driven by a one-time increase in consumption at the time
of refinancing. Although this finding is somewhat surprising, it is con-
sistent with IO mortgages relaxing financial constraints related to mort-
gage payments at the time of refinancing for the individuals who chose an
IO mortgage. Because we are examining within-household differences in
consumption over time, these results suggest borrowing constraints were
loosened but consumption continued on a path similar to pre-refinancing
levels.
Our analysis focuses on the average response to IO mortgages. How-
ever, the response may differ across households with a different need for
consumption smoothing. We therefore analyze heterogeneity in the re-
sponse to choosing an IO mortgage across several empirical measures of
credit constraints and the need for consumption smoothing.
Table 6 provides the results for mortgage-to-income, consumption-to-
income, and assets-to-income as the dependent variable. We use several
proxies for credit constraints. First, we use the house-value-to-income ra-
tio to measure the importance of payment-to-income constraint. We have
interacted a dummy for high house-value-to-income ratio with the time
period of our focus. Specifically, house-value-to-income in this table is a
dummy for house-value-to-income in 2002 above the median. We interact
time dummies with the group indicator, and, for a pre-refinancing period,
report a coefficient on a dummy for refinancing more than two years in
the future, a coefficient for the year of refinancing, and a coefficient for the
post-refinancing period.
Households with an above-median house-value-to-income ratio increase
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their mortgage-to-income by more than households with a below-median
house-value-to-income ratio, and their consumption response in the year of
refinancing is also higher. Households with an above-median house-value-
to-income increase their mortgage by 0.73 times disposable income, com-
pared to 0.44 times disposable income for below-median households. More-
over, above-median households have a significantly larger post-refinancing
consumption level, which suggests a household with a high house-value-to-
income ratio has a larger marginal propensity to consume out of amortiza-
tion payments.
Second, younger households (< 45 years old) borrow significantly smaller
amounts during refinancing to an IO mortgage, which translates to a sig-
nificantly lower impact on consumption. Young households also have a
lower consumption-to-disposable-income ratio in the years after refinanc-
ing than older households. Older households therefore, on average, use IO
mortgages to reduce savings.
Third, liquidity- and borrowing-constrained households increase their
mortgage by less, and consume less in the year of refinancing. Consistent
with the theoretical framework, an IO mortgage leads to a lower increase in
mortgage debt and in consumption for borrowing-constrained households,
defined as having a high loan-to-value ratio in 2002.
Taken together, our findings suggest an important heterogeneity in
the responses across households. Households with higher house-value-to-
income ratios are able to borrow more with an IO mortgage and also in-
crease their consumption more. However, with a binding collateral con-
straint, the benefit from an IO mortgage is lower. These results are broadly
consistent with IO mortgages relaxing PTI constraints.
7 Conclusion
We examine the impact of interest-only mortgages on consumption growth.
Using a measure of exposure to the mortgage reform observed prior to the
introduction of the new mortgage product, we find the introduction of IO
mortgages had a positive and significant impact on household consumption
and borrowing. In aggregate, the IO-mortgage reform explains approxi-
mately half of the growth in consumption expenditure between 2003 and
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2010. Moreover, we find this result is primarily driven by higher borrowing
at the time of refinancing rather than lower amortization payments.
Overall, our results show that changing amortization payments can have
a large impact on consumption expenditure. If a large number of house-
holds choose to refinance over the same period, the one-time adjustment in
mortgages can have a substantial impact on the growth rate of aggregate
consumption. Both additional borrowing and the lower amortization rate
will lead to a higher level of consumption, but the aggregate effect may dis-
sipate as more and more households have already refinanced. Our findings
suggest the presence of interest-only mortgages as a mortgage option may
turn out to be not substantial in affecting aggregate consumption dynamics
after the initial shock to consumption has expired. However, the introduc-
tion and the increased popularity of these mortgages create the increase in
consumption in Denmark rather than the availability of these mortgages.
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For Online Publication: Appendices
A Appendix: Municipality-Level Price In-
dex
We construct a municipality-level house-price index using data on all trans-
actions in Denmark. The data are from The Danish Gazette (Statstidende),
and cover the universe of Danish property transactions as a part of the ju-
dicial process of transferring ownership. We combine the data on property
sales with data on individual property characteristics from the Housing
Register (Bygnings- og Boligregister, BBR). Further, we collect data on
property ownership to identify trades between spouses and family mem-
bers, and to identify trades that occur due to the death of a spouse or due
to divorce. These trades are removed from the final sample because they
are less likely to be sold at market prices.22
After collecting the data on all property transactions, we connect each
house and apartment to the Housing Register (BBR) to find the property
type (apartment, single-family house or summer house). We further drop
outliers in the sales price by removing the top and bottom 1 percent in
the sale-price distribution, and by removing any transactions where the
transaction price is listed as zero. The resulting sample of households is
then used to calculate the average square-meter price for traded properties
in all municipalities.
22Removing family trades and similar non-market transactions are common in the
construction of real estate indices. See, for example, the S&P Case-Shiller index method-
ology: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller.
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B Appendix: Figures
Figure 9: Borrowing under Two Constraints
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Notes: The figure plots maximum borrowing when we increase the LTV ratio from 0.8 to 1. All
parameter values are the same as in Figure 2, unless otherwise indicated. The solid blue (red) is the
maximum borrowing (leverage) under the LTV and PTI constraint. The dashed blue (red) line is the
maximum borrowing (leverage) under the new LTV ratio.
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Figure 10: Interest payment to income relative to house value to income
Notes: The figure plots interest payment to income against house value to income. All parameter
values are the same as in Figure 2, unless otherwise indicated. Interest payments are calculated as the
mortgage debt to income times the mortgage rate. The dashed vertical line shows the threshold where
the payment-to-income constraint starts to bind.
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Figure 11: Durable and Non-Durable Consumption
Notes: The figure plots durable and non-durable consumption from 2000Q1 to 2010Q4 for Denmark.
The series are normalized to 100 in 2000Q1. Data come from the Denmark Statistics series “NKHC3:
Final consumption of households on the economic territory by duration, price unit and seasonal adjust-
ment”. Series is in 2010-prices, chain values and is seasonally adjusted.
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C Appendix: Tables
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Low HV/Inc Mid HV/Inc High HV/Inc Difference Highest-Lowest
Housing Market Characteristics
House Price Growth 2003-2006 28.39 35.48 45.92 -17.54
(12.46) (13.90) (14.33) [-211.73]
Household Demographic Characteristics
Age 45.54 45.78 46.69 -1.15
(6.49) (6.39) (6.33) [-28.98]
Education Length 14.18 14.41 14.49 -0.31
(2.21) (2.07) (2.28) [-22.21]
Family Size 3.22 3.18 2.78 0.44
(1.21) (1.19) (1.33) [55.47]
Employment Ratio during the Year 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) [4.04]
Household Financial Characteristics
Consumption 362,535 370,530 363,718 -1,183
(145,678) (152,520) (184,820) [-1]
Disposable Income 367,609 368,001 347,741 19,868
(177,990) (105,393) (128,693) [21]
Mortgage Debt 447,310 633,561 771,091 -323,781
(317,720) (372,859) (523,486) [-121]
House Value 813,093 1,234,971 1,800,124 -987,031
(306,925) (376,817) (754,621) [-278]
Housing Wealth to Income 2 3 5 -3
(0) (0) (2) [-397]
Sum of Liquid Assets 141,065 134,738 169,312 -28,247
(661,930) (303,001) (1,900,740) [-3]
Interest Payments 42,303 52,643 55,771 -13,468
(25,850) (28,270) (35,579) [-70]
Consumption growth 2002-2006 0.08 0.11 0.14 -0.06
(0.46) (0.47) (0.54) [-19.58]
Income growth 2002-2006 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.02
(0.17) (0.16) (0.22) [-15.11]
IO mortgage 0.30 0.38 0.49 -0.19
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) [-52.47]
Liquid Assets to Income 0.34 0.35 0.46 -0.12
(0.62) (0.61) (0.81) [-26.77]
Mortgage to Income 1.23 1.74 2.26 -1.03
(0.80) (0.92) (1.36) [-149.47]
Equity Extraction 0.14 0.16 0.19 -0.05
(0.35) (0.37) (0.39) [-21.00]
Mortgage Rate 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) [15.10]
Interest Payments to Income 0.08 0.10 0.12 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) [-96.32]
Liquidity Constrained 0.45 0.43 0.37 0.08
(0.50) (0.49) (0.48) [26.33]
Borrowing Constrained 0.61 0.62 0.51 0.11
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) [35.64]
Observations 52568 52568 52567 105135
Notes:
Table reports the summary statistics for households over groups of house-value-to-income ratio, and
the differences between them, including the results from a T-test for the differences. We report demo-
graphic and financial characteristics. Demographics include age, years of education, family size, and the
employment ratio during the year. Financial characteristics include consumption (defined in section 3),
disposable income (the sum of income minus taxes, transfers, and interest-payments), mortgage debt
as the market value of outstanding mortgage debt, house value as the tax assessed value of all housing
properties multiplied by the scaling factor, liquid assets as the sum of stocks, bonds, and cash deposits
holdings, interest payments as the sum of mortgage and bank deb interest payments. Mortgage rate
is the sum of mortgage interest payments divided by the market value of the mortgage. All variables
marked as ”to Income” are divided by disposable income. House-price growth is defined as the percent-
age growth in square-meter prices from 2003 to 2006. Personal income growth is the percentage growth
in personal income (defined as the total income that the individual receives from all sources). Equity
extraction is a dummy for mortgage debt higher by more than 10 percent year-over-year. IO mortgage
is a dummy for the individual with an IO mortgage in 2009. Liquidity constrained is a dummy for
liquid assets less than 1.5 months of income, and borrowing constrained is a dummy for mortgage value
divided by house value greater than 0.5. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% for the T-test.
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results
(1) (2) (3)
Mortgage Consumption Assets
-6+ 0.017 -0.018 0.061
(0.004) (0.003) (0.014)
-5 -0.000 -0.011 0.055
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
-4 0.004 -0.004 0.043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
-3 0.005 -0.003 0.040
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
-1 -0.044 -0.023 -0.184
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
0 0.194 0.152 0.439
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
1 0.149 0.001 0.065
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
2 0.125 -0.020 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
3 0.095 -0.013 -0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
4 0.062 -0.012 -0.021
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 438,142 435,062 440,515
Notes: The table shows the estimated effects and standard errors from estimating equation 5. Control
variables include age dummies, education length and family size. All regressions include household fixed
effects and year dummies. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level.
Standard errors clustered on households in parentheses.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in Dynamics – Age and House Value to Income
Mortgage Consumption Assets Mortgage Consumption Assets
to income to income to income to income to income to income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X = House Value to Income X = Age
Pre Refinancing -0.118 0.003 0.034 -0.041 0.013 -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Year of Refinancing 0.440 0.171 0.123 0.657 0.207 0.222
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Post Refinancing 0.328 0.006 0.036 0.557 0.019 0.120
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
Pre Refinancing × X 0.117 0.005 -0.025 -0.033 -0.016 0.045
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Year of Refinancing × X 0.290 0.029 0.105 -0.103 -0.043 -0.081
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Post Refinancing × X 0.256 0.008 0.039 -0.160 -0.017 -0.121
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
X = Liquidity Constrained X = Borrowing Constrained
Pre Refinancing -0.012 0.009 0.023 -0.131 -0.014 -0.023
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Year of Refinancing 0.638 0.206 0.229 0.884 0.273 0.310
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
Post Refinancing 0.493 0.019 0.104 0.796 0.044 0.207
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.007)
Pre Refinancing × X -0.080 -0.005 -0.004 0.093 0.025 0.055
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Year of Refinancing × X -0.054 -0.036 -0.083 -0.349 -0.108 -0.160
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Post Refinancing × X -0.024 -0.015 -0.074 -0.398 -0.042 -0.181
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.007)
Observations 443,183 429,343 444,427 443,183 429,343 444,427
Notes: The table shows the estimated effects and standard errors from estimating equation 5 with
interactions. The interaction variable is listed in the top row (X = House Value to Income for interaction
effects by a dummy for above median house value to income). House-value-to-income is a dummy for
values above the median value in 2002. Young is a dummy for the individual below 45 years of age.
Liquidity constrained is a dummy for the sum of liquid assets less than 1.5 months of disposable income.
Borrowing constrained is a dummy for mortgage values in 2002 above 0.5 times house values. Control
variables include age dummies, education length and family size. All regressions include individual fixed
effects and year dummies. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level.
Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
43
